Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2

Article 9

What About Know-How: Heightened
Obviousness and Lowered Disclosure is Not a
Panacea to the American Patent System for
Biotechnology Medication and Pharmaceutical
Inventions in the Post-KSR Era
Yi-Chen Su
Milner Law Office, PLLC

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Repository Citation
Yi-Chen Su, What About Know-How: Heightened Obviousness and Lowered Disclosure is Not a Panacea to the American Patent System for
Biotechnology Medication and Pharmaceutical Inventions in the Post-KSR Era, 14 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 321 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol14/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

SU FINAL 5-17-10

5/19/2010 2:29 PM

WHAT ABOUT KNOW-HOW:
HEIGHTENED OBVIOUSNESS AND
LOWERED DISCLOSURE IS NOT A
PANACEA TO THE AMERICAN PATENT
SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
MEDICATION AND PHARMACEUTICAL
INVENTIONS IN THE POST-KSR ERA
YI-CHEN SU*
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................... 322
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 322
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OBVIOUSNESS ................................ 325
III. THE NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY MEDICATION AND
PHARMACEUTICALS ........................................................................ 327
IV. OBVIOUSNESS IN OTHER PATENT SYSTEMS .................................... 332
A. The Practice of the European Patent Office ............................. 333
B. Obviousness in Germany ........................................................... 336
C. Obviousness in the United Kingdom ......................................... 338
D. Obviousness in Canada .............................................................. 341
E. Obviousness in China ................................................................. 346
F. Obviousness in Japan .................................................................. 349
V. OBVIOUSNESS IN THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM ........................ 352
A. TSM Test...................................................................................... 352
B. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc..................................... 357
C. Federal Circuit’s Interpretation and Application of KSR ....... 359
D. U.S. PTO’s Response to KSR.................................................... 361
E. In re Kubin .................................................................................. 365
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 368

* The author is the managing partner of the Asian office for Milner Law Office, PLLC,
New York. 2009 LL.M. in Intellectual Property Law, George Washington University Law
School; J.D., City University of New York School of Law; M.S. in Genetics, National Yang
Ming University; DVM, National Chung Hsing University. The Article was developed from
the author’s LL.M. thesis in spring 2009. The author appreciates the invaluable comments
from Professor Martin J. Adelman and Professor Joseph Straus. The author can be reached at
nicksu_law@hotmail.com.

SU FINAL 5-17-10

5/19/2010 2:29 PM

322 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2

ABSTRACT
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the “teaching,
suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), and replaced it with an
“expansive and flexible” approach, in determining the question of
obviousness. Nevertheless, an expansive and flexible approach to
obviousness may not be consistent with the international norms of
practice if it is applied literally. The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s literal application of the KSR decision has essentially created
another set of inflexible rules, which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
intent.
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin cautiously
revived “obvious to try” in its obviousness jurisprudence. However, In
re Kubin may not represent a clear precedent for determining
obviousness in the biotechnological context. Certain key technological
factual issues were unclear when the court was making its judgment.
Commentators have suggested that “a fairly high obviousness
threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure requirement will produce
a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries.” Nevertheless,
lowering the disclosure requirement in the biotechnological context
would provide inventors incentives to retain more know-how and thus
frustrate the purposes of the existing statutory exemptions, namely the
“medical practice exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) and the so called
“FDA exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Therefore, this Article
suggests that the high disclosure requirement for biotechnological
patent applications should not be sacrificed as a tradeoff for a
heightened obviousness standard.

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in KSR
1
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. in 2007, the decision has created legal
uncertainty concerning obviousness from at least three perspectives.
First, the application of the obviousness doctrine between the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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(PTO) are inconsistent. Second, the PTO’s practice regarding the
standard of obviousness before and after KSR lacks consistency. Third,
the obviousness standard in a re-examination proceeding after KSR for
a patent issued before that decision is uncertain.
2
Though the KSR court revered Graham v. John Deere Co. as the
highest principle in making obviousness determinations, the KSR
decision has essentially created the same problem that the Graham
court sought to resolve—that is, the inconsistency among the courts and
the Patent Office.
In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid
application of “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), and
replaced it with an “expansive and flexible” approach, in determining
3
the question of obviousness. Before KSR, the Federal Circuit had
developed a more rigid approach, the TSM test. In rejecting the rigid
application of the TSM test, the Supreme Court replaced it with an
expansive and flexible approach by stating that, “[t]he combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
4
when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
Nevertheless, an expansive and flexible approach to obviousness
may not be consistent with the international norms of practice if it is
applied literally. Moreover, even if an expansive and flexible approach
to obviousness is favorable and can be justified, the PTO’s literal
application of the KSR decision has essentially created another set of
inflexible rules for the determination of obviousness, which is contrary
to the Supreme Court’s intent.
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin cautiously
5
revived “obvious to try” in its obviousness jurisprudence. The decision
has narrowed the gaps between the court and the PTO after KSR to
some extent. However, In re Kubin may not represent a clear precedent
for determining obviousness in the biotechnological context because
certain key technological factual issues were unclear and unanswered
6
when the court was making its judgment.
Commentators have suggested that a judge-made industry-specific
standard of patentability tailored for each industry in which certain
common characteristics can be found is preferable. Commentators also
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 416.
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (C.A. Fed. 2009).
Id.
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suggested that “a fairly high obviousness threshold coupled with a fairly
low disclosure requirement will produce a few very powerful patents in
7
uncertain industries.”
Nevertheless, lowering the disclosure
requirement in the biotechnological context would provide inventors
incentives to retain more know-how and thus frustrate the purposes of
the existing statutory exemptions, namely the “medical practice
8
exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) and the so called “FDA
9
exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
This Article starts with the introduction of the historical
background of obviousness as a requirement of patentability in various
countries in Part II. Part III further examines why biotechnology
invention is especially vulnerable to the challenge on the ground of
obviousness. Part IV examines how the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) and other major patent systems, such as Germany, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and China have approached the issue of
obviousness, especially in the biotechnological and pharmaceutical
contexts.
Then the focus of this Article turns to the American patent system.
Part V begins with the examination of the application of the Federal
Circuit’s TSM test in biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts
before KSR, followed by the Supreme Court’s KSR test, and the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation and application of obviousness test in
the pharmaceutical context after KSR. In addition, this Part examines
and compares the obviousness tests and their application in
biotechnology cases in the PTO’s practice before and after KSR. A
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Kubin follows, which
may be deemed as a step in filling the gaps between the court and the
PTO on the disagreement of obviousness standard in the
7. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1682 (2003).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) provides that:
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) . . . solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
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biotechnological context.
This Article suggests that a judge-made industry-specific standard of
obviousness in biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s teaching in KSR that the
evaluation of obviousness should remain flexible. Nevertheless, the
current high disclosure requirement for biotechnological patent
applications should not be sacrificed as a tradeoff for a heightened
obviousness standard.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OBVIOUSNESS
“Non-obviousness,” “inventive step,” or “inventive level” is a
relatively new requirement of patentability compared to novelty and
10
utility. Novelty and utility were regarded as common law prerequisites
for the issuance of a privilege and the predecessors of patentability
11
requirements. Unlike novelty or utility, non-obviousness is a product
of modern patent law and was not developed until the middle of the
12
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
Section 103 of the present American Patent Act provides that
obviousness shall be tested by reference to the differences between the
13
invention and the prior art.
The non-obviousness criterion was
codified in the 1952 American Patent Act as a requirement that the
claimed invention taken as a whole not be obvious to one of ordinary
14
skill in the art at the time the invention was made.
The new provision was intended by Congress to abolish the “flash
of genius” test set by the Supreme Court and to instigate a milder
15
standard of inventiveness.
However, there was no case law or
literature about the meaning of the new provision until 1966 in the
16
Supreme Court’s opinion, Graham v. John Deere Co.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, it was not until the British Patent Act of
1977, the inventive step, which was the European counterpart of
obviousness, was fully introduced into the British patent statute as a
17
separate patentability requirement.
In England, though the
10. Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Inventive Step in Its Historical Development, 3 I.I.C. 301,
301–03 (1986).
11. Id. at 302–03.
12. Id. at 303.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
14. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1648–49; 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
15. Beier, supra note 10, at 309.
16. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
17. Beier, supra note 10, at 313.
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requirement of an inventive step was first introduced in 1932 into the
18
British patent statute, it was initially only as a ground for revocation of
19
issued patents.
It was recognized in England, earlier than elsewhere, that a small
20
step may advance the art.
Contrary to the United States’ patent
system, as Friedrich-Karl Beier has stated, the primary emphasis of the
introduction of inventive step to the British patent system was the
technical and economic importance of the differences between the prior
art and the claimed invention, rather than “the kind of creative criteria
21
or the more or less ingenious abilities of the inventor.”
As commentators have observed, in the United States, much of the
case law concerning the person having ordinary skill in the art arises out
of the consideration of the obviousness standard in § 103 of the Patent
22
Act. It contributes to the result that the application of the personhaving-ordinary-skill-in-the-art standard varies by industry, which led
to, for example, fewer but broader software patents, and more but
23
narrower biotechnology patents.
The development of a higher patentability requirement in Germany
has its unique historical background. In Friedrich-Karl Beier’s opinion,
it was the creation of the protection of utility models for smaller
technical improvements that freed the hands of the German patent
system and German courts to demand additional prerequisites for
patent protection and higher standards for the originality or works of
24
applied arts.
The German Utility Model Act of 1891 introduced a new form of
25
protection which came into force with the amended Patent Act. Under
the utility model system, in addition to the protection of examined
patents, a simpler and faster protection could be obtained without
26
previous examination.
The protection of utility model, which still
exists today, allowed the German patent system and courts to apply
27
stricter standards for the longer lasting and better protected patents.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1648.
Id. at 1650.
Beier, supra note 10, at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, the requirement of patentability in Germany has
changed in the process of harmonizing European patent law since the
28
1960’s. The prerequisite of inventive step was introduced into the
29
German patent statute. In addition, the advance in art, or technical
progress, as a separate patentability requirement for seeking German
30
patent protection was entirely dismissed.
Though obviousness is a relatively new concept compared to other
patentability requirements, the advance of technology has continuously
challenged and forced the relevant authority to re-examine the
feasibility of such a standard. Specifically, the diversity of technologies
today has raised the question whether a standard created before a
specific industry emerging can be feasibly employed without
modification to determine the inventiveness of an invention in such an
industry. Biotechnology is simply one among many examples.
III. THE NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY MEDICATION AND
PHARMACEUTICALS
Both traditional and modern definitions of biotechnology
acknowledge that sharing techniques and experiment procedures are
essential to the development of biotechnology. Biotechnology has been
generally defined as “the use of biology or biological process to develop
31
helpful products and services.” A modern definition of biotechnology
is “the set of biological techniques originally resulting from basic
research, specifically molecular biology and genetic engineering, and
32
now used for research and product development.” Popular examples
of biotechnology techniques and processes include recombinant DNA,
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology, DNA sequencing
33
instruments, and expressed sequence tags (EST). These technologies
and processes are all useful research tools which have greatly enhanced
34
the progress of biotechnology.
Though building-block technologies have enhanced the progress of
biotechnology, in the mean time, they also have served as prior art to
28. Id. at 323.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. U.S.
Dep’t
of
Agric.,
Biotechnology
&
Genomics,
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/biotech/biotech_all.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
32. Id.
33. Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right
to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 273 (2005).
34. Id.
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block certain valuable inventions from attaining patent protection on
the ground of obviousness.
In turn, these potentially valuable
inventions may not be able to attract sufficient financial funding to
move forward. Without patent protection, potential funders for the
inventions may withhold their funding for fear that the inventions would
be copied by free-riders easily when the inventions become matured.
In addition, “[t]he ready availability of tools for finding a new
biotechnology product does not change the high cost and uncertainty
35
entailed in developing a marketable product using those tools.” Many
patentable inventions in biotechnology spring from known components
and methodologies found in the prior art. Such combinations of prior
art may be logical to try, but the advances “are only won through trial
and error, at great effort and expense, and with only a low probability of
36
success in achieving the claimed invention.” As the Biotechnology
Industry Organization has argued in the amicus brief in KSR
37
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., “[r]esearch and development in the
biotechnology industry is particularly expensive, time-consuming, and
presents an unusually high-risk investment that relies on an objective
38
and predictable application of obviousness law.”
Nevertheless, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) provides that “[p]atentability shall
39
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” It
is true that research tools, such as bioinformatics and DNA databases,
have enhanced biotechnology research. However, if the ease of a
research process is taken into account in a negative sense to counteract
the finding of non-obviousness, then the length of time, the amount of
money, or the quality and quantity of human resources devoted to a
certain invention should be taken into account in a positive sense for the
finding of non-obviousness.
Biotechnology shares the common characteristics of pharmaceutical
industry and DNA research. The long development and testing lead
time characteristic of pharmaceuticals can also be found in DNA40
related innovation.
As commentators have observed, “[i]f any
technology fits the criteria of high-cost, high-risk innovation, it is
35. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1678.
36. Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04–1350).
37. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
38. Amicus Curiae Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization at 8, KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
40. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1624–25.
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41

certainly biotechnology.”
The patent law has been perceived by some as conflicting with the
42
traditional norms of sharing in the field of biotechnology research.
Nevertheless, the norm may be changing or has been changed when
modern biotechnology in general is no longer confined in basic research
but focusing on how to reduce to practice and benefit the public.
“[I]nnovation in the biomedical fields, while critical to human health,
also poses concerns for health and safety until the long-term effects of
43
new drugs can be determined.”
The underlying policy is best
illustrated in the statement made by the Legal Board of Appeal of the
EPO in T1020/03, which reads:
It is the very responsible task of physicians to treat their patients
according to the best method known to the physician, and the
more well-established the method is the more certain the
physician can be of its success. However the knowledge as to the
best treatments has to be gained somehow, from in vitro tests, in
vivo tests on cells and animals, and clinical trials under specially
44
supervised conditions. This needs to be financed.
Inventing a new drug or a biomedical product is only the beginning
45
of the process, not the end. Industries that must spend more time and
money in research and development (“R&D”) generally have a greater
46
need for patent protection. For instance, the R&D, drug design, and
testing of a new drug in the pharmaceutical industry can take a decade
47
or more and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Moreover, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) requires a lengthy and rigorous set of
tests before companies can release drugs or biotechnology medications
48
to the market. It makes the already expensive process even more
costly.
As Professor Merges has proposed, obviousness or non-obviousness

41. Id. at 1676.
42. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184–85 (1987).
43. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1588.
44. T1020/03 Genentech Inc./Method of Administration of IGF-I [EPO (Legal Bd.
App.)], [2006] E.P.O.R. 9: 67, 93.
45. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1616.
46. Id. at 1583.
47. Id. at 1581.
48. Id. at 1616.
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should be viewed as a function of uncertainty. Where uncertainty is
high, courts should moderately lower the standard of patentability to
50
compensate for the risk of failure. Under the theory, uncertain and
high-cost innovation, especially for those which are very expensive in
the early stages, should more likely be entitled to a determination of
51
non-obviousness.
The Federal Circuit has concluded that chemistry, pharmaceutical
52
research, and biotechnology are inherently uncertain disciplines. In
53
addition to Professor Merges’s uncertainty-based view of obviousness,
commentators have also suggested that, if patents are to drive
innovation in biotechnology, rather than merely invention, courts must
take account of the cost and uncertainty of post-invention testing and
54
development.
“Where commonalities within an industry can be
identified, tailoring may sometimes be best accomplished via judicial
55
application of a bright-line rule.” This led to the proposal of judge56
made industry-specific standards of patentability.
Though commentators suggested that “a fairly high obviousness
threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure requirement will produce
57
a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries,” a lower disclosure
requirement may impede biotechnology research and use to a greater
extent than the benefit brought about by granting fewer patents.
Specifically, lowering the disclosure requirement for biotechnology
inventions would frustrate non-infringing use, such as the “medical
58
practice exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) and the so-called “FDA

49. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1 (1992).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 69.
52. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (finding that biotechnology is an uncertain discipline); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at
1655.
53. Merges, supra note 49, at 3.
54. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1678.
55. Id. at 1639.
56. Id. at 1696.
57. Id. at 1682.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) provides that:
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity.
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59

exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
Lowering the high disclosure requirement would increase the
burden of a non-infringing user in acquiring additional information,
60
namely the know-how, for an effective use regardless of whether the
patent for that invention is granted. Biotechnology research, as well as
the use of biotechnology, requires a high demand of precision. High
precision in operating such technology generally relies on a high
disclosure requirement in the prior art. Lowering the disclosure
requirement would provide inventors incentive to retain more “knowhow.” Without first acquiring such information from the inventor, noninfringing use would be unlikely if the high disclosure requirement is
removed. It would essentially grant inventors more leverage to hinder
legitimate use by others.
61
62
As evidenced by the study of point mutation or single mutation,
one single nucleotide or amino acid missing or misplaced at a critical site
may cause reading-frame shifting, drastic loss of specificity, or change of
characteristic in the resulting DNA, RNA, or protein. When a noninfringing use becomes too burdensome, it essentially renders the
statutory exemption meaningless.
Thus, lowering the disclosure
requirement, even just exempting one single nucleotide or amino acid
from disclosure, would be enough to cripple the existing statutory
exemptions.
Moreover, unlike “obvious to try” as an indicator of “obviousness”
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) . . . solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
60. See BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD ET AL., DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS
193 (BNA Books 2008) (1971).
61. Point mutation is defined as “[a] single nucleotide base change in the DNA. A
point mutation may consist of the loss of a nucleotide, the insertion of an additional
nucleotide, or the substitution of one nucleotide for another.” MedicineNet.com, Definition
of Point Mutation, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=4968 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009). A classical example of human diseases caused by a point mutation is sickle
cell anemia. See id.
62. For example, a single amino acid substitution in N1 nuraminidase of human
influenza virus confers the virus high level drug resistance to oseltamivir. World Health Org.,
Influenza
A
(H1N1)
Virus
Resistance
to
Oseltamivir,
available
at
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:VXLj600kE1oJ:www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/oselta
mivir_summary/en/index.html+single+mutation&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009).
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in other disciplines, “obvious to try” is an anomaly in the
biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts. Because of the high
costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical research, a research proposal
is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of financial support without the
projection of a “reasonable expectation of success.” Nevertheless, a
documented “reasonable expectation of success” would render an
invention “obvious to try” under a “one-size-for-all” obviousness
standard. As a result, only very few, if any, biotechnology or
pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the suspicion of “obvious to
try” if the nature of the industry and the characteristic of the technology
is not taken into consideration.
As a result, the judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard
for biotechnology medication and pharmaceutical inventions suggested
in the thesis is referred to as a lower obviousness threshold coupled with
a high disclosure requirement. Before turning the focus of this Article
to the American patent system, Part IV first examines how other major
patent systems have approached the issue of obviousness, especially in
the biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts. Specifically, the
Canadian system may be deemed as an example of the judge-made
industry-specific approach, though this approach is traceable to English
case law.
IV. OBVIOUSNESS IN OTHER PATENT SYSTEMS
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has extensive jurisdiction
over patent-law claims in which district courts would have jurisdiction
63
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Because of the lack of competing circuits in
adjudicating patent issues, including obviousness, a comparative study
among other major patent systems may have some value before
discussing the obviousness jurisprudence in the United States.
The obviousness examinations in major patent systems may be
sorted into three basic categories. The first category is a rigid step-bystep analysis, as exemplified by the EPO practice. The second type is a
judge-made industry-specific approach, as exemplified by the Canadian
common law. The third approach is a higher obviousness standard
supplemented with a less stringent utility model protection as a safety
net, as represented by the German patent system.
Nevertheless, some patent systems choose to adopt certain features
63. E.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834
(2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2007) (providing “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patent”).
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from different models and thus signify the compromise among different
models. The obviousness tests adopted in the United Kingdom and
Japan are step-by-step analysis but they are not as rigid as the EPO
approach. It is interesting to note that the Chinese patent system has
adopted an agency-generated industry-specific obviousness standard for
chemical compounds and biotechnology inventions, although judges are
not allowed to make law under its current political and legal system. In
addition to China, Japan represents another civil law system that has
adopted industry-specific inventive-step rules for biotechnology
inventions.
A. The Practice of the European Patent Office
The analysis of obviousness in the EPO’s practice is a rigid step-by64
65
step approach. It is called the problem-and-solution approach. This
approach is a means to show that an invention is lacking an inventive
step “by demonstrating the existence of an obvious route” between the
66
closest prior art and the claimed invention. The goal of this approach
67
is to assess inventive step in an objective and predictable manner.
“Inventive step” is the European equivalent of “non-obviousness.”
Article 56 of the European Patent Convention provides that “[a]n
invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having
regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the
68
art.”
As non-obviousness, inventive step is a requirement of
patentability.
The problem-and-solution approach is essentially comprised of
69
70
three steps: (i) determining the “closest prior art”; (ii) establishing the
71
“objective technical problem” to be solved; and (iii) considering
whether or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art
and the objective technical problem, would have been obvious to the

64. See George S.A. Szabo, The Problem and Solution Approach in the European
Patent Office, 4 I.I.C. 457, 458 (1995).
65. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.7.
(European Patent Office, Dec. 2007).
66. Szabo, supra note 64, at 458.
67. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch.
IV, § 11.7.
68. European Patent Convention art. 56, Oct. 10, 1973, revised Dec. 13, 2007.
69. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch.
IV, § 11.7.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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skilled person.
First, the closest prior art is a single reference, which constitutes the
most promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the
73
claimed invention.
Contrary to the doctrine of inherency in U.S.
practice, as George S.A. Szabo has explained, the recognizable content
of the closest prior art should not include hidden properties which the
74
skilled person cannot be aware of. In practice, the closest prior art is
selected from references which correspond to a similar use and require
the minimum of structural and functional modifications to arrive at the
75
claimed invention.
The closest prior art being selected may be
different from the prior art of which the applicant was actually aware at
76
the time the application was filed.
Combination of other references with the closest prior art is
77
permissible. However, “the fact that more than one disclosure must be
combined with the closest prior art in order to arrive at a combination
78
of features may be the sign of the presence of an inventive step.”
Second, the objective technical problem in the problem-andsolution approach context “means the aim and task of modifying or
adapting the closest prior art to provide the technical effects that the
79
invention provides over the closest prior art.”
In formulating the
problem, one should study the patent application, the closest prior art,
80
and identify their difference.
The difference is also called “the
81
distinguishing features” of the invention. The distinguishing features
between the invention and the closest prior art can be either structural
82
or functional.
In order to avoid hindsight judgment, the objective technical
problem must not contain any pointer to the technical solution offered
72. Id.
73. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch.
IV, § 11.7.1. The single reference being selected “should be directed to a similar purpose or
effect as the invention or at least belong to the same or a closely related technical field as the
claimed invention.” Id.
74. Szabo, supra note 64, at 463.
75. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch.
IV, § 11.7.1.
76. Id. § 11.7.2.
77. Id. § 11.8.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 11.7.2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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83

by the invention. In addition, the term “technical problem” does not
suggest that the technical solution must be a technical improvement
84
over the prior art. Thus, as George S.A. Szabo has explained, “all
quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the result, attributable to
85
the modifications of the prior art in question, should be given credit.”
On the other hand, where no problem at all can be recognized in the
closest prior art, the consequence is that the claimed invention is
86
necessarily non-obvious with respect to the closest prior art.
In the final stage of analysis, it is specifically called the “could87
would approach.”
This is another measure to avoid hindsight
judgment in the analysis. The key is to ask whether there is any
teaching in the prior art as a whole that “would,” rather than just
“could,” have prompted the skilled person, “faced with the objective
technical problem, to modify or adapt the closest prior art while taking
account of that teaching, thereby arriving at something falling within the
88
terms of the claims, and thus achieving what the invention achieves.”
It is irrelevant to the analysis whether a skilled person “could” have
done the same thing as the applicant.
In practice, the burden is on the EPO or with the opponent to prove
that “a skilled person would have done so” and to refute the
89
presumption of patent validity. As George S.A. Szabo has observed,
90
this is contrary to the practice in the United States. In the United
States, the possibility of “could” usually evokes a prima facie
obviousness objection leaving the applicants with the difficult task of
91
proving that “a skilled person would not have done the same.”
The inventive-step test in the EPO practice is a rigid step-by-step
analysis. It is carefully crafted to avoid hindsight judgment, which is
often stated as “a skilled person could have done the same.” Though
Germany is a signatory state of the European Patent Convention
(EPC), some have observed that the inventive-step standard in the

83. Id.
84. Id. “[T]he problem could be simply to seek an alternative to a known device or
process providing the same or similar effects or which is more cost-effective.” Id.
85. Szabo, supra note 64, at 466.
86. Id.
87. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch.
IV, § 11.7.3.
88. Id.
89. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475.
90. Id.
91. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475.
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German patent system may be higher than the EPO practice due to
procedural reasons. Nevertheless, the German utility model system has
provided sufficient protection to inventions which possess relatively
minor inventive steps.
B. Obviousness in Germany
Germany had abandoned the requirement of “technical progress,”
which was considered a higher standard of obviousness, after its
92
harmonization with the European patent system. However, some have
observed that the concept of “technical progress” continued to affect
the German courts’ determination of inventive step or obviousness at
93
least in certain cases. Alternatively, others have suggested that the
difference of inventive step between the German patent system and the
EPO practice, if any, is due to the accessibility and the different weight
94
95
given to evidence such as prior art or secondary consideration.
Nevertheless, a higher standard of obviousness can be justified under
the German patent system because in difficult cases, such as the second
medical indication of a pharmaceutical, the utility model protection may
96
be available.
Though “technical progress” is no longer a prerequisite of
patentability under the German patent system, the German Federal
Supreme Court in Trigonellin stressed that, it should not be the purpose
97
of patent law to protect and encourage nonsense. Under the European
patent system, national courts are bound by the EPO and the
98
Implementation Regulation but not the Examination Guidelines. As
Alfred Keukenschrijver has observed, the German Federal Patent
Court is often dissatisfied with the level of inventive step that the EPO

92. Beier, supra note 10, at 323.
93. Alfred Keukenschrijver, European Patents with Effect for Germany in the Light of
Recent Federal Supreme Court Decisions, 7 I.I.C. 711, 720 (2003).
94. See, e.g., id. at 711; Rüdiger Rogge, The Revocation of European Patents in
Germany, 2 I.I.C. 217 (1996).
95. See Jochen Pagenberg, Different Level of Inventive Step for German and European
Patents? The Present Practice of Nullity Proceedings in Germany, 6 I.I.C. 763 (1991)
[hereinafter Pagenberg, Different Level].
96. Dieter R. Schneider, Patenting of Pharmaceuticals—Still a Challenge?, 5 I.I.C. 511,
518–19 (2008).
97. Keukenschrijver, supra note 93, at 720. The German Federal Supreme Court’s
Trigonellin decision was issued in 2001. Id. at 719; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice] 2001, 147 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 730 (F.R.G).
98. Id. at 714.
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99

applies.
However, after examination of twenty-nine decisions
rendered by the German Federal Supreme Court from 1996 to 2000, he
concluded that, at least statistically, there is no proof that the German
Federal Supreme Court has a hostile attitude towards European
100
patents. If the German courts evaluate the inventive step differently
from the EPO, it was suggested that it may arise from two possibilities,
101
namely the admissibility of evidence and the different weight given to
102
secondary considerations.
First, the German procedural law has adopted “the principle of the
unrestricted assessment of evidence,” while only documented and
103
published evidence is admissible in the EPO practice. Therefore, the
discrepancy between the German courts and the EPO concerning the
problem-and-solution-approach may arise from the definition of the
104
person skilled in the art resulting from different sources of evidence.
For instance, the EPO has criticized the German Federal Supreme
Court for imposing a high level of specialist skills without citing any
105
published evidence in certain cases.
Second, it was suggested that the weight given to secondary
considerations may have affected the determination of inventive step in
the German patent system, but it was inconclusive. It has long been
debated that various German courts have weighed secondary
106
considerations differently.
However, it is inconclusive whether this
factor, if it exists, has affected the inventive-step standard in the
German patent system.
Though the German patent system has arguably adopted a higher
inventive-step standard compared to the EPO practice, the German
utility model system has served as a safety net providing sufficient

99. Id. at 713.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., id. at 711 (2003); Rogge, supra note 94.
102. See, e.g., Jochen Pagenberg, Examination for Nonobviousness—A Critical
Comment on German Patent Practice, 1 I.I.C. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Pagenberg, A Critical
Comment]; Ernst K. Pakuscher, Examination for Nonobviousness—A Response, 6 I.I.C. 816
(1981); Jochen Pagenberg, Examination for Nonobviousness—Concluding Observations, 6
I.I.C. 824 (1981) [hereinafter Pagenberg, Concluding Observations]; Pagenberg, Different
Level, supra note 95.
103. Keukenschrijver, supra note 93, at 715.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 718.
106. See, e.g., Pagenberg, A Critical Comment, supra note 102; Pakuscher supra note
102; Pagenberg, Concluding Observations, supra note 102; Pagenberg, Different Level, supra
note 95, at 763.
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protection to inventions which possess relatively minor inventive step.
For instance, under German law, processes are generally excluded from
utility model protection and “uses” are regarded as a form of
107
processes. Nevertheless, in difficult cases, such as the second medical
indication of a pharmaceutical, the German Federal Supreme Court in
Arzneimittelgebrauchsmuster stated that the use of a pharmaceutical is
108
more closely linked to a substance than to a process. Therefore utility
109
model protection is possible.
A higher obviousness standard under the German patent system
can be justified because the utility model protection has served as a
safety net for inventions in which the inventive step is difficult to
evaluate. Like Germany, the United Kingdom is under an obligation to
harmonize its patent system with its European counterparts. However,
unlike Germany, the United Kingdom has its common law tradition,
which is distinct from the civil law systems on the European continent.
Under a common law system, the evolution of law primarily rests in the
courts.
C. Obviousness in the United Kingdom
The inventive-step analysis in the United Kingdom is flexible in that
it has taken specific categories of inventions, such as chemical class
claim, and the high-tech nature of an invention into account. In a recent
case reviewed by the English House of Lords, Lord Walker of
Gestingthorpe has stated that a precedent decided more than four
decades ago may not be applicable to a case concerning modern
technology which did not even exist when the precedent was decided.
Specifically, an “obvious to try” rationale stemming from a low-tech
process may not be applicable to a high-tech context.
The English Court of Appeal first established its inventive-step test
110
in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd. In 2007, the
107. Schneider, supra note 96, at 519.
108. Id. at 518; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 5, 2005,
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz and Urheberrecht [GRUR] 135, 136 (F.R.G.).
109. Id. at 519.
110. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73–74 (C.A.) (Civ.
Div.). The original test includes four steps:
The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in suit.
Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but
unimaginative addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what
was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in question. The third step is
to identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as being “known
or used” and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether,
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English Court of Appeal modified and restated the Windsurfing test in
111
The court summarized the restated
Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA.
Windsurfing test as the following:
(1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”
(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that
person;
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if
that cannot readily be done, construe it;
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter
cited as forming part of the ‘state of the art’ and the inventive
concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as
claimed, do those differences constitute steps which would have
been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they require
112
any degree of invention?
Before indentifying the inventive concept of a claim, there should
113
be claim construction to find out what the claim means. In principle,
the inventive concept should be derived from the claim in question,
rather than some generalized concept derived from the specification as a
114
115
whole. However, the principle is not so wooden. The Pozzoli court
acknowledged that it may be impractical to identify the inventive
116
After all,
concept in certain cases, such as a chemical class claims.
“[i]n the end what matters is/are the difference(s) between what is
117
claimed and the prior art.”
In 2008, the House of Lords reaffirmed that the question of
obviousness should be determined by reference to the claim in issue,
rather than some vague paraphrase based upon the extent of the
118
disclosure in the description. In Conor Medsystems, Inc. v. Angiotech
viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute
steps which would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any
degree of invention.
Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ 588.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 19.
Conor Medsystems, Inc. v. Angiotech Pharms., Inc., [2008] UKHL 49, ¶ 19.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lord Hoffmann rebuffed the challenger’s
argument as “watering down the claimed invention by reference to what
119
[the challenger] said were inadequacies in the specification.”
The English patent system has long recognized that an “obvious to
try” test can be relevant in an obviousness inquiry. However, the House
of Lords also recognized that the “obvious to try” test has its limitation.
In Conor Medsystems, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe cautioned about
being trapped into the anomaly of “obvious to try” in his separate
120
opinion.
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe restated the observation
made by the EPO concerning obvious to try:
If the reward for finding a solution to a problem and securing a
monopoly for that solution is very high, then it may well be
worthwhile for large players to examine all potential avenues to
see if one gives the right result, even though the prospects of any
one of them succeeding are much less than 50/50. What makes
something worth trying is the outcome of a simple risk to reward
calculation. Yet, if the reward is very large, the avenues worth
trying will be expanded accordingly. So, the more commercially
attractive the solution and the more pressing the public clamour
121
for it, the harder it will be to avoid an obviousness attack.
122

As Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe has stated, the English precedent
establishing the rationale of “obvious to try” was decided more than
four decades ago, and that case was concerned with a fairly low-tech
123
process. During the last forty years, the volume of biotechnology and
124
pharmaceutical research has increased enormously.
The potential
125
rewards in worldwide markets are great and the competition is fierce.
“In this climate ‘obvious to try’ has tended to take on a life of its own as
an important weapon in the armory of those challenging the validity of a
126
patent.”
Quoting from Sir Hugh Laddie, Lord Walker of
Gestingthorpe restated that “as technology advances rapidly, this is a
127
serious and growing problem.”
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 45–48.
Id. ¶ 48.
Johns-Manville Corporation’s Patent, [1967] R.P.C. 479.
Conor Medsystems, Inc., UKHL 49, ¶ 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 48.
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Recent opinions of the English courts have suggested a trend of an
industry-specific obviousness analysis for the biotechnology medications
or pharmaceuticals, though the underlying reason may be, at least in
part, due to the English patent system’s obligation as a signatory state of
the EPC in harmonizing with its European counterparts. As technology
advances, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in the English House of Lords
has opined that a precedent decided more than four decades ago may
not be applicable to a case concerning modern technology which did not
128
even exist when the precedent was decided. Moreover, an “obvious to
try” rationale stemming from a low-tech process may not be applicable
to a high-tech context. On the other hand, the Canadian patent system
is an example which has elected an industry-specific approach without a
mandate to harmonize with other patent systems.
D. Obviousness in Canada
The Canadian patent system has essentially adopted a judge-made
industry-specific obviousness standard, at least for pharmaceutical
inventions. This approach, as exemplified by the selection patent
doctrine, has a root traceable to the English case law. In a recent case
reviewed by the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court further interpreted
“obvious to try” as a high burden of proof if a challenger chooses to
argue on this ground.
The Canadian obviousness jurisprudence was first enunciated by the
Federal Court of Canada, Appellate Division, in Beloit Canada Ltd. v.
129
Valmet Oy. It was later adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in
130
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc.
The Beloit court started its analysis by defining what a technician
131
skilled in the art would possess.
In the Beloit court’s view, for the
purpose of determining obviousness, a technician skilled in the art
132
should possess “no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination.” In other
words, the hypothetical technician skilled in the art must be
133
unimaginative.
128. Conor Medsystems, Inc. UKHL 49, ¶ 47.
129. Beloit Canada, Ltd. v. Valmet Oy, [1986], 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (Fed. C.A.).
130. Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 9 C.P.R. (4th) 129, ¶ 49 (S.C.C.); see also,
e.g. Procter & Gamble Pharms. Canada, Inc. v. Canada, [2004], 37 C.P.R. (4th) 289, ¶ 45
(Fed. C.A.).
131. Beloit Canada, 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17.
132. Id.
133. Apotex, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., [2000], 10 C.P.R. (4th) 65, ¶ 63 (Fed.
C.A.).
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The court stressed that non-obviousness is “a very difficult test to
134
The question in an obviousness analysis to be asked is
satisfy.”
whether a technician skilled in the art “would, in the light of the state of
the art and of common general knowledge as at the claimed date of
invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution
135
taught by the patent.”
In addition, the Beloit court expressed its caution about the
adoption of expert testimony in the determination of obviousness. In
the court’s view, expert testimony is admissible even on “an ‘ultimate
136
issue’ question such as obviousness.”
However, it must be treated
137
with extreme care, because “[e]very invention is obvious after it has
138
been made, and to no one more so than an expert in the field.”
“Where the expert has been hired for the purpose of testifying, his
139
infallible hindsight is even more suspect.”
Therefore, before an
expert’s assertion can be given any weight, the expert must have a
satisfactory answer to the question, “Why didn’t you do it if it is so
140
easy?”
It is worth noting that the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has
extended the selection patent doctrine to the selection between two
141
isomers of a racemate in Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex,
134. Beloit Canada, 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17.
The classical touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the art but
having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and
dexterity, wholly devoid of intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right.
The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature (the man in the Clapham
omnibus of patent law) would, in the light of the state of the art and of common
general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and
without difficulty to the solution taught by the patent. It is a very difficult test to
satisfy.
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 20.
137. Id.
138. Id. ¶ 21.
Every invention is obvious after it has been made, and to no one more so than an
expert in the field. Where the expert has been hired for the purpose of testifying, his
infallible hindsight is even more suspect. It is so easy, once the teaching of a patent
is known, to say, “I could have done that”; before the assertion can be given any
weight, one must have a satisfactory answer to the question, “Why didn’t you?”
Id.
139.
140.
141.
known as

Id.
Id.
A racemate is a substance containing equal amounts of two optical isomers,
the dextro-rotatory isomer (also known as the d enantiomer, and represented by
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142

Inc. in 2006. The selection patent rationale was established in Pfizer
143
Canada, Inc. v. Canada in the same year.
The court in Pfizer Canada, Inc. identified two general classes of
144
chemical patents.
They are the originating patent and selection
145
patent. The former is referring to “an originating invention involving
146
The latter is
the discovery of a new reaction or a new compound.”
referring to “a selection from related compounds derived from the
original compound and which have been described in general terms and
147
claimed in the originating patent.”
It is immaterial whether a selection patent is claimed for a selection
148
from a class of thousands or for a selection of one out of two.
The
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal referred to English case law and
stated that “the ‘inventive step in a selection patent lies in the discovery
that one or more members of a previously known class of products
possess some special advantage for a particular purpose which could not
149
be predicted before the discovery was made.’” The policy behind the
selection patent doctrine is “to encourage researchers to further use
their inventive skills so as to discover new advantages for compounds
150
within the known class.”
However, “[a]ll claimed members of the known class must have the
advantage and the advantage must not be one that those skilled in the
art would expect to find in a large number of the previously disclosed
151
class.”
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in a later case
rephrased the requirement that “the validity of [a selection patent]
depends on it having unexpected advantages over the class from which
152
it is selected.” In other words, “[n]o one can claim a selection patent
153
merely for ascertaining the properties of a known substance.”
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Sanofi-Synthelabo
[+]) and the levo-rotatory isomer (also known as the l enantiomer, and represented by [-]).
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. [2006], 59 C.P.R. (4th) 46, ¶ 4 (Fed. C.A.).
142. Id.
143. Pfizer Canada, Inc. v. Canada, [2006], 52 C.P.R. (4th) 241 (Fed. C.A.).
144. Id. ¶ 3.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 5.
149. Id. ¶ 4.
150. Id. ¶ 5.
151. Id. ¶ 4.
152. Id. ¶ 69.
153. Id. ¶ 24.
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Canada, Inc. affirmed the trial judge’s finding that a selection patent
claimed for a selection of one isomer out of two may meet the threshold
154
of non-obviousness. In Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., the prior-art
patent specifically identified twenty-one individual racemates, including
the racemate from which the separated isomers were obtained in the
155
patent at issue.
However, the court agreed with the trial judge’s
finding that
there is no teaching on how to separate the racemates
into their isomers, and no mention or suggestion [in the
prior art] that there are any pharmaceutical or
toxicological differences between the isomers of the
disclosed racemates with respect to activity or
156
tolerability.
Though the separation technique was well-known, it “had to be tried
with uncertainty as to which would actually result in a successful
157
separation.” Therefore, a selection patent claimed for a selection of
one isomer out of two may satisfy the requirement of non158
obviousness.
On appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court again
affirmed the appellate court judge’s finding and stated that the finding
was unaffected by the lower court’s rejection of the “obvious to try”
159
test.
The Canadian Supreme Court sought advice from the English
160
161
Windsurfing test, as restated by the English Court of Appeal in 2007,
in analyzing a potential “obvious to try” situation where the Canadian
162
163
Beloit test would not accommodate. The question to be asked in the
fourth step of the Windsurfing test is that “[v]iewed without any
knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
(Can.).
160.
Div.).
161.
162.
163.

See Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 59 C.P.R. (4th) 46, ¶ 44.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 42.
See id. ¶ 44.
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., [2008] 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶ 72
Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73–74 (C.A.) (Civ.
Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ. 588, ¶ 23.
Beloit Canada, Ltd. v. Valmet Oy, [1986], 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17 (Fed. C.A.).
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶¶ 52, 60, 67.
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constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in
164
the art or do they require any degree of invention?” In applying the
test, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that it is “the fourth step of the
Windsurfing/Pozzoli approach to obviousness that the issue of ‘obvious
165
to try’ will arise.”
Before conducting an “obvious to try” analysis, a court needs to
166
determine whether the analysis is warranted in such a situation.
In
situations where an “obvious to try” analysis is warranted, the Canadian
Supreme Court suggested a list of factors that a court should take into
167
consideration at the fourth step of the obviousness inquiry.
168
In particular, unlike the American approach, the Canadian
Supreme Court stated that there should be “no reason to exclude
evidence of the history of the invention, particularly where the
knowledge of those involved in finding the invention is no lower than
169
what would be expected of the skilled person.”
“[W]here those
involved including the inventor and his or her team were highly skilled
in the particular technology involved, the evidence may suggest that the
skilled person would have done a lot worse and would not likely have
170
managed to find the invention.”
In such a situation, the inventors’
course of conduct would suggest that it would not have been obvious for
171
a skilled person to try the course that led to the invention.
Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court has noted that “obvious to

164. Id. ¶ 67.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 68. An “obvious to try” analysis might be appropriate in areas where
advances are often won by experimentation. Id. A pharmaceutical invention might warrant
an “obvious to try” analysis where “there may be many chemically similar structures that can
elicit different biological responses and offer the potential for significant therapeutic
advances.” Id.
167. Id. ¶ 69. The Court cautioned that this is not an exhaustive list:
(1) Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are there a
finite number of identified predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art?
(2) What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the
invention? Are routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged and
arduous, such that the trials would not be considered routine?
(3) Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent
addresses?
Id.
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
169. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶ 70.
170. Id. ¶ 71.
171. Id.
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try” is not a mandatory test. Whether it is a factor to be considered
173
Most
depends on the context and the nature of the invention.
174
importantly, “obvious to try” “is not a panacea for alleged infringers.”
As the Court has stated, “[t]he patent system is intended to provide an
175
economic encouragement for research and development.” “It is well
known that this is particularly important in the field of pharmaceuticals
176
and biotechnology.”
Before finding an invention “obvious to try,” “there must be
evidence to convince a judge on a balance of probabilities that it was
177
more or less self-evident to try to obtain the invention.” As a result,
the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted the “obvious to try” test
as a high standard to meet if the challenger of patent validity chooses to
argue on this ground.
The Canadian obviousness jurisprudence represents an industryspecific approach, which has taken the specific characteristic of the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries into account, specifically
the adoption of the selection patent doctrine and the expansion of such
doctrine to the selection between two isomers. Though the Canadian
Supreme Court has adopted the “obvious to try” rationale from English
case law, the Court has interpreted “obvious to try” as a high standard.
Unlike Canada or the United Kingdom, judges in countries which have
a civil law tradition cannot make law. Alternatively, certain countries
provide industry-specific obviousness standard in their Patent
Examination Guidelines. China and Japan are two examples.
E. Obviousness in China
The obviousness analysis under the Chinese patent system possesses
two distinct features. On the one hand, the Chinese patent system has
adopted the European problem-and-solution approach in general. On
the other hand, the Chinese patent office provides special obviousness
rules for chemical compound and biotechnology inventions. Therefore,
its obviousness standard retains certain industry-specific features as seen
in the Canadian or English patent system, though judges cannot make
law under the Chinese legal and political system.
172. Id. ¶ 62.
173. Id.
174. Id. ¶¶ 62, 64.
175. Id. ¶ 64.
176. Id.
177. Id. ¶ 66. The mere possibility that something might turn up is not enough to find
“obvious to try.” Id.
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Inventiveness is one of the patentability requirements in addition to
178
The
novelty and practical applicability under Chinese Patent Law.
179
inventiveness requirement applies to both the invention and utility
180
181
For the
models, although the definitions of inventiveness differ.
purposes of patent application, inventiveness means that, as compared
with the technology existing before the date of filing, the invention has
182
“prominent substantive features” and represents a “notable progress.”
For the purposes of utility-model application, the utility model should
183
possess “substantive features” and represent “progress.”
The so called “prominent substantive features” is the Chinese
184
equivalent of “non-obviousness.” All inventions that have prominent
substantive features would automatically fall into one of the four
circumstances listed in the Guideline for Examination, and therefore
185
meet the “notable progress” requirement.
No additional inquiry is
needed. Moreover, despite the differences in statutory language, the
Chinese patent system has essentially adopted the same problem-and-

178. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. II, art. 22 (2000).
179. “Invention” in the Chinese Patent Law means any new technical solution relating
to a product, a process or improvement. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the
People’s Republic of China, ch.1, rule 2 (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China on June 15, 2001, and effective as of July 1, 2001), available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33871.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009).
180. “Utility model” in the Chinese Patent Law means any new technical solution
relating to the shape, the structure, or their combination, of a product, which is fit for
practical use. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China,
ch.1, rule 2 (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on June 15,
2001,
and
effective
as
of
July
1,
2001),
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33871.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009).
181. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Guanle Wu, How to Get a Patent in China, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,
available
at
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1321548/How%20to%20get%20a%20patent%20in%20
China.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
185. Id. The four circumstances are (1) the invention produces a better technical effect
compared with the prior art; (2) the invention provides a technical solution which has a
different technical concept but has a technical effect substantially the same level as in the
prior art; (3) the invention represents a new trend in the development of new technology; and
(4) in certain aspects, the invention has some negative effects, but it has outstanding positive
technical effect in other respects. Guideline for Examination, pt. II, ch. 4, §3.2.2 (State
Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2006) (hereinafter
Chinese Guideline for Examination).
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solution approach in determining obviousness as the EPO.
Unlike common law systems as exemplified by the United Kingdom
or Canada, a judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard is
187
unlikely to occur in China. Alternatively, the Chinese patent system
has provided industry-specific obviousness standards for specific
industries, such as chemistry and biotechnology, in the Guideline for
188
Examination.
As specifically provided in the Guideline, the inventive step of a
compound should not be denied simply on the ground of structural
189
190
similarity, unless it does not possess unexpected use or effect.
Before an examiner makes such a rejection, “[i]t is necessary to further
explain that its use or effect can be expected or is predictable, or that a
person skilled in the art is able to produce or use that compound by
logical analysis, inference or limited experiment on the basis of the prior
191
art.”
In addition to chemical compounds, the Chinese Examination
Guideline provides in great length the special rules for determining the
192
inventive step of inventions relating to genetic engineering
or
193
microorganism. Under the category of inventions relating to genetic
engineering, specific rules are provided for patent applications in which
the claimed subject matter is gene, recombinant vector, transformant,
194
fused cell, or monoclonal antibody respectively.
Generally, “a person skilled in the art cannot expect” or
“unexpected technical effects compared with the prior art” is required
for a finding of inventive step for an invention relating to genetic
195
engineering.
Specifically, where the protein or the amino acid
186. Chinese Guideline for Examination § 3.2.1.1. As provided in the Guideline for
Examination, three steps are followed to determine whether a claimed invention is obvious as
compared with the prior art: first, determining the closest prior art; second, determining the
distinguishing features of the invention and the technical problem actually solved by the
invention; and third, determining whether or not the claimed invention is obvious to a person
skilled in the art. Id.
187. Under the Chinese Constitution, judicial decisions are subject to interference by
legislatures, which exercise a supervisory function over the courts. Stanley Lubman, Looking
for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 30 (2006).
188. Chinese Guideline for Examination, supra note 184, ch. 10.
189. Id. § 6.1(4).
190. Id. § 6.1(2).
191. Id. § 6.1(4).
192. Id. § 9.4.2.1.
193. Id. § 9.4.2.2.
194. Id. § 9.4.2.1(1)(5).
195. Id.
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sequence of the protein is known, if a claimed gene has a specific base
sequence and has technical effects compared with other genes having a
different base sequence encoding the same protein, which a person
skilled in the art cannot expect, then the invention of the claimed gene
196
involves an inventive step.
The invention of a monoclonal antibody
generally does not involve an inventive step, unless “the invention is
further defined by other features, and hence has unexpected technical
effects,” then the invention of that monoclonal antibody involves an
197
inventive step.
In patenting a microorganism itself, the minimal requirement is
that, so long as the microorganism produces technical effects that
cannot be expected by a person skilled in the art, it involves an inventive
198
step. An invention relating to the use of a microorganism involves an
inventive step if the microorganism used in the invention is remarkably
different from a microorganism of known species with taxonomic
199
characteristics, even if the use is the same as the prior art. Otherwise,
there is no inventive step unless unexpected technical effects are
200
found.
Under the current Chinese political and legal system, it is unlikely
for the courts to develop a judge-made industry-specific obviousness
standard. Though the Chinese patent system has generally adopted the
European problem-and-solution approach in determining obviousness,
the patent office has employed special obviousness rules for chemical
compound and biotechnology inventions. In addition to China, the
Japanese patent system is another example which has expressly
provided an industry-specific obviousness standard in its Examination
Guidelines.
F. Obviousness in Japan
The determination of inventive step under the Japanese patent
system is generally based on the comparison between the claimed
invention and one of the cited references which is considered the most
201
suitable for the reasoning. One single cited reference is selected for

196. Id. § 9.4.2.1(1).
197. Id. § 9.4.2.1(5).
198. Id. § 9.4.2.2(1).
199. Id. § 9.4.2.2(2).
200. Id.
201. Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in Japan, pt. II, ch. 2, §
2.4(2) (Japan Patent Office, June 2006) (hereinafter Japanese Examination Guidelines).
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this purpose.
However, the Examination Guidelines do not exclude
examiners from taking other cited inventions or even general common
203
knowledge into account as the basis of comparison.
Similar to
Germany, the Japanese patent system also provides utility model
204
protection.
As provided in the Examination Guidelines, the Japanese inventivestep test is basically comprised of four steps: first, finding of the claimed
invention and one or more cited inventions; second, selecting one cited
invention most suitable for the reasoning; third, comparing the claimed
invention with the most suitable prior art; fourth, clarifying the
205
identicalness and the difference in matters defining the inventions. If
reasoning can be made based on the contents of the most suitable prior
art, other cited inventions, and the common general knowledge, then
206
the claimed invention lacks an inventive step. On the other hand, if
the reasoning cannot be made, the claimed invention cannot be denied
207
its involvement of an inventive step.
Similar to the selection of the closest prior art in the EPO problemand-solution approach, the Japanese inventive-step test includes the
208
step of selecting the most suitable prior art. This step is deemed as a
means to reduce the effects of hindsight on the decision of
209
obviousness.
The Japanese Examination Guidelines also provide a method in
handling selection inventions, which involves the finding of
210
advantageous effects. A selection invention involves an inventive step
when it generates an advantageous effect, which is not disclosed in a
211
cited reference. An advantageous effect is defined as an effect which
is advantageous in comparison with an effect of a cited invention,
among the effects derived from the matters defining a claimed
212
invention. An advantageous effect can be found when the invention is

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. pt. X, ch. 1–2.
205. Id. pt. II, ch. 2, § 2.4(2).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Tomotaka Homma, Comparing Japanese and U.S. Standards of Obviousness:
Providing Meaningful Guidance After KSR, 48 IDEA 449, 483 (2008).
210. Japanese Examination Guidelines, supra note 200, § 2.5(3).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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qualitatively different, or qualitatively the same but quantitatively
prominent, in comparison with that of a cited invention disclosing a
generic concept, provided that neither of the effect can be foreseen by a
213
person skilled in the art from the state of the art. However, regardless
of the finding of advantageous effects, inventive step may be denied if a
person skilled in the art could have easily arrived at a claimed
214
invention.
Basically, an “advantageous effect” is the Japanese
equivalent of the “unexpected technical effects compared with the prior
art” under the Chinese patent system.
The Japanese patent system is another example, which has provided
industry-specific obviousness standards for biological inventions
expressly in its Examination Guidelines. For instance, the inventive
step of inventions involving genetic engineering and microorganisms are
215
treated differently than other subject matter.
Inventions resulting
216
from genetic engineering are further divided into five basic categories.
They are genes, recombinant vectors, transformants, fused cells, and
217
monoclonal antibodies. Nevertheless, unlike biological inventions, the
Examination Guidelines state that the inventive step analysis regarding
medicinal inventions is not different from the general test though the
Guidelines have devoted great length in explaining what constitutes a
218
concrete practice of the judgment.
The Japanese patent system has arguably adopted a higher
obviousness standard because it allows patent examiners more leeway in
considering prior art or evidence compared to the EPO’s problem-andsolution approach. However, similar to the German patent system, a
higher obviousness standard in Japan can be justified because the
system provides utility model protection to inventions with relatively
minor inventiveness, in addition to an agency-made biotechnologyspecific obviousness standard.
In the United States, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had
developed a more rigid and arguably restrictive obviousness test, until
the Supreme Court rendered its KSR decision in 2007. To some extent,
the American patent system may be deemed as the fourth type of
obviousness approach after KSR. That is, a higher obviousness standard

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id. pt. VII, ch. 2, § 1–2.
Id. § 1.3.3.
Id.
Id. ch. 3, § 2.3.
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without a safety-net provision comparable to the utility model system.
V. OBVIOUSNESS IN THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
The “consistency, uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and
relevant body of patent jurisprudence” is the underlying policy for the
219
creation of the Federal Circuit.
As Justice Stevens stated in his
dissenting opinion in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board v.
220
221
College Saving Bank, which cited Graham, “[t]here is, . . . a strong
federal interest in an interpretation of the patent statutes that is both
uniform and faithful to the constitutional goals of stimulating invention
and rewarding the disclosure of novel and useful advances in
222
technology.”
The Federal Circuit’s experiment in developing a more rigid
obviousness test was halted by the Supreme Court’s KSR decision.
Nevertheless, another experiment in developing a judge-made industryspecific obviousness standard was somehow undisturbed.
Though the KSR court revered Graham as the highest principle in
making obviousness determinations, the KSR decision has essentially
created the same problem that the Graham court sought to resolve.
That is, the inconsistency among the courts and the Patent Office.
A. TSM Test
Before KSR, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal and its
predecessor had developed a teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM)
223
test. Similar to the EPO’s problem-and-solution approach, the TSM
test was designed to guard against hindsight judgment especially in the
224
situation where more than one reference needs to be considered. The
European problem-and-solution approach does not have the same
problem because of its selection of one single closest prior art, rather
than multiple references, as the basis of comparison with the claimed
invention.
The TSM test is part of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor’s
anti-hindsight jurisprudence, as well as the “motivation to combine”

219. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Saving Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
650–52 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
222. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (C.A. Fed. 2006).
224. See id.
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225

requirement.
Under the TSM test, “a court must ask ‘whether a
person of ordinary skill in the art, possessed with the understandings
and knowledge reflected in the prior art, and motivated by the general
problem facing the inventor, would have been led to make the
226
combination recited in the claims.’”
The legal determination of
obviousness “should be based on evidence rather than mere speculation
227
or conjecture.” Such evidence includes expert testimony regarding the
knowledge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
228
possessed at a given time.
Under the Federal Circuit’s obviousness jurisprudence, “motivation
to combine” alone is not sufficient to find obviousness. In addition to
the “motivation to combine” the prior art, it is a predicate to the finding
of obviousness that the motivation of a person of ordinary skill in the art
needs to be coupled with a “reasonable expectation of success” in doing
229
so.
Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit stated in Alza Corp. v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc. that the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the relevant prior art teachings “does not have to be found
230
explicitly in the prior art.” “[T]he teaching, motivation, or suggestion
231
However, implicit
may be implicit from the prior art as a whole.”
teaching, suggestion, or motivation is subject to a limitation. That is,
“rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
232
conclusory statements.” “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
233
obviousness.”
Like other patent systems, the Federal Circuit had cautioned about
the use of “obvious to try.” However, unlike the Canadian Supreme
Court, which has interpreted “obvious to try” as a high standard to
234
meet, the Federal Circuit was of the opinion that ‘“obvious to try’’ is

225. See id.
226. Id. (citing Cross Med. Prods., Inc., v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d
1293, 1321–24 (C.A. Fed. 2005)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1294.
229. Id. at 1293.
230. Id. at 1290.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1291.
233. Id.
234. See Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., [2008] 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶
66 (Can.).
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not a standard under § 103.
As the Federal Circuit explained in In re O’Farrell, “obvious to try”
236
often leads to mainly two kinds of errors.
First, where the prior art
gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful,
though it is obvious to try, the inventor has to vary all parameters or try
237
each of numerous possible choices before reaching a successful result.
Second, where the prior art gave only general guidance, though it is
obvious to try, what the inventor is doing is to explore a new technology
or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of
238
experimentation.
Commentators have also cautioned about the use of “obvious to
try.” For instance, George S.A. Szabo has cautioned about using
“obvious to try” in determining obviousness by explaining the
connection among reasonable expectation of success, obvious to try, and
239
the size of the reward.
In view of a high probability of success, a
degree of uncertainty or some residual risk may remain, even if obvious
240
to try. When the expected size of the reward is low, there should be
no obvious good reason for a skilled person to try, and therefore it may
241
be oddly found non-obvious. On the other hand, when the expected
size of the reward is enormous, there is obvious good reason to try, even
242
if the degree of uncertainty or residual risk remains high. As a result,
243
it may be oddly found obvious. The odd results should be avoided in
estimating the mental likelihood for a skilled person to proceed with the
available information toward the invention in certain disciplines, such as
chemistry, pharmacy, and biotechnology.
Moreover, it appeared that “obvious to try” was merely a factor
under the “reasonable expectation of success” standard, rather than a
separate test, under the obviousness jurisprudence established by the
244
Federal Circuit before KSR. As Professor Merges has observed, “[i]f

235. See, e.g., In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (C.A. Fed. 1988); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d
1552, 1559 (C.A. Fed. 1995).
236. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Merges, supra note 49, at 42.
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an inventor is faced with a large number of variables, and the prior art
does not provide enough guidance to narrow those down to a
245
manageable level, then an inventive step is needed to proceed.”
Consequently, the skilled person in the art could not be reasonably
246
certain of success, and it rendered the invention non-obvious. On the
other hand, based on the Federal Circuit’s “obvious to try” cases, such
247
as Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., “if the number of
possible permutations has been limited by the prior art, then a mechanic
could plod through them one at a time and be reasonably certain of
248
success.”
Therefore, the finding of “obvious to try” alone, without
more, does not render an invention obvious.
Long before KSR, the Federal Circuit had demonstrated a judgemade industry-specific obviousness standard in the biotechnology
context that has taken the nature of the specific technology into
249
consideration. For instance, it was suggested in In re Bell and was
reaffirmed in In re Deuel that “the existence of a general method of
isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the
question whether the specific molecules themselves would have been
obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed
250
DNAs.”
This principle has recognized the building-block nature of
251
biotechnology research.
The Federal Circuit has also concluded that chemistry,
pharmaceutical research, and biotechnology are inherently uncertain
252
disciplines. Though the Federal Circuit is in the view that the results
of biotechnology research are unforeseeable or unpredictable and thus
may avoid the problem of obviousness, the court has imposed an
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804 (C.A. Fed. 1989).
248. Merges, supra note 49, at 42.
249. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (C.A. Fed. 1993).
250. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (C.A. Fed. 1995).
251. For example, the laboratory handbook entitled Molecular Cloning: a Laboratory
Manual, which was published by the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, is widely used in
almost every biotechnology laboratory as a basic research tool. Nonetheless, the handbook
providing standard research procedures in the industry was cited in various cases as one of
the prior art providing “motivation to combine.” See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360
(C.A. Fed. 2009). “Valiante cites to the very same cloning manual, Sambrook, cited by Kubin
and Goodwin for their proposition that the gene sequence is identified and recovered ‘by
standard biochemical methods.’” Id.
252. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (finding that biotechnology is an uncertain discipline); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at
1655.
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extremely stringent standard for disclosure and description.
As a
result, biotechnology patents may be relatively easier to pass the
Federal Circuit’s obviousness standard, but the accompanying high
enablement and written description standards dramatically narrow the
254
scope of the patents eventually issued. The Federal Circuit’s practice
before KSR, to some extent, had avoided the broad blocking-patent
problems in the biotechnology industry while offering patent
protections as the industry needed.
As Professors Burk and Lemley have observed, the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence has increasingly treated patents from various
255
industries differently. For instance, “the Federal Circuit has gone to
inordinate lengths to find biotechnological inventions non-obvious, even
256
if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention.”
Though Professors Burk and Lemley have a different view concerning
obviousness standards for biotechnology inventions, the Federal
Circuit’s practice has essentially echoed Professors Burk and Lemley’s
proposal for a judge-made industry-specific patentability standard.
In the mean time, Professors Burk and Lemley criticized the
Federal Circuit that “while the patent statute leaves ample room for
courts to consider the needs of particular industries, the Federal Circuit
has proven somewhat reluctant to embrace its role in setting patent
257
policy.” “Not only has it proven unwilling to pay much attention to
the empirical evidence about innovation, but it has also taken a number
of steps toward eliminating the flexible standards of the patent common
258
law in favor of bright-line rules.” It was the general dissatisfaction of
the Federal Circuit’s attempt in setting bright-line rules, if any, which
led to the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in 2007.

253. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1681. Alternatively, Professors Burk & Lemley
suggested that “a fairly high obviousness threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure
requirement will produce a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries.” Id. at 1682. “It
will therefore solve the anti-commons problem often identified with biotechnology while at
the same time boosting incentives to innovate.” Id. However, biotechnology research
requires high level of precision. Without high level of disclosure in prior art, researchers
referring to the prior art would fall into undue experimentation and it would in turn increase
inefficiency in research and impede innovation.
254. Id. at 1678.
255. Id. at 1593.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1579.
258. Id.
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B. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
The Supreme Court in KSR disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s
rigid application of the TSM test and favored an expansive and flexible
259
approach instead.
Nevertheless, it may be beyond the KSR court’s
expectation that its KSR decision has created the same problem that its
260
predecessor sought to resolve in Graham more than four decades ago.
The framework for applying the statutory language of § 103 was set
261
out by the Supreme Court in Graham. Though the Supreme Court in
KSR embraced the obviousness principles laid out in Graham, the KSR
decision has unexpectedly created the same problem confronting the
Graham court more than forty years ago. That is, “a notorious
difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by
262
the courts.”
KSR is a case involving a mechanical invention, namely an
263
“adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.” The KSR
court identified the principles set forth in Graham as an objective
264
analysis. The Graham test is the following:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
265
matter
sought
to
be
patented.
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court in KSR did not oppose
the TSM test but that the Federal Circuit has applied it too rigidly in the
case at issue. The KSR court also recognized that the principles laid out
266
in KSR may not be applicable outside the factual context of that case.
259. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 411 (2007).
260. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
261. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 407.
262. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
263. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405.
264. Id.
265. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405.
266. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417.
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here
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As the KSR court has stated, “[t]here is no necessary inconsistency
267
between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.”
However, “when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid
rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did
268
here, it errs.”
“What we hold is that the fundamental
misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case
269
to apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions.”
In rejecting the rigid application of the TSM test, it appears that a
rigid step-by-step obviousness analysis, such as the EPO’s problem-andsolution approach, may not be acceptable in the Supreme Court’s
270
view. Instead, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the analysis
271
of obviousness should be industry-specific.
In addition to the rejection of a rigid application of the TSM test,
the KSR court also faulted the Federal Circuit’s long-standing caution
272
about “obvious to try.”
However, the KSR court’s statement about
“obvious to try” may be subject to various interpretations, as its
declaration regarding the “expansive and flexible” approach. For
instance, on the one hand, the KSR court appeared to be of the opinion
273
that merely “obvious to try” is sufficient to find obviousness. On the
other hand, the Court seemed to suggest that several conditions, such as
a finite number of identified solutions and anticipated success, need be
274
met before “obvious to try” amounts to obviousness.
because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of
one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a
piece of prior art ready for the improvement.
Id.
267. Id. at 419.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 422.
270. See id., at 419. “The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” Id.
271. See id. “The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels
against limiting the analysis in this way.” Id.
272. Id. at 421.
273. Id. “The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error,
that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of
elements was ‘obvious to try.’” Id.
274. Id.
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a
finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good
reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to
the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill
and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try
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The Supreme Court in KSR acknowledged the importance of
275
avoiding hindsight judgment, yet it has rejected a rigid step-by-step
approach of obviousness analysis. It leaves open for the later courts to
develop a device serving such purposes. As examined in Part III, an
industry-specific obviousness standard may be an appropriate solution.
Moreover, as a common law system, the United States has more leeway
to develop a judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard than
civil law systems, such as China or Japan, which have no option but to
promulgate agency rules in the Examination Guidelines.
Though the Supreme Court identified the Graham test as an
276
objective one, the irony is, if a test is expansive and flexible it may be
subject to various interpretations and inferences. Consequently, the test
is more likely than not, subjective. The inconsistency in its application
follows suit. That is what occurred after KSR within the American
patent system, specifically between the Federal Circuit and the PTO.
C. Federal Circuit’s Interpretation and Application of KSR
Despite the Supreme Court’s KSR decision, the Federal Circuit
assures inventors that “a flexible TSM test remains the primary
277
guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis.”
In the postKSR era, the Federal Circuit continues to develop its industry-specific
approach, at least in cases involving chemical arts.
KSR is a case involving a mechanical invention, namely an
278
“adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.” It is not
factually similar to a chemical invention, a pharmaceutical invention, or
a biotechnological invention.
After KSR, the Federal Circuit continued to develop its industryspecific obviousness standard, at least in chemical related fields, with
little disturbance by KSR. As Judge Newman has stated in Abbott
279
Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., “[t]he Court in KSR did not create a
presumption that all experimentation in fields where there is already a
background of useful knowledge is ‘obvious to try,’ without considering
might show that it was obvious under § 103.
Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 405.
277. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharmpty, Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (C.A.
Fed. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (C.A. Fed.
2008).
278. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405.
279. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (C.A. Fed. 2008).
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the nature of the science or technology.” It remains that “[e]ach case
must be decided in its particular context, including the characteristics of
281
the science or technology.”
In several cases, the Federal Circuit has expressed the opinions that
the obvious-to-combine scenario in KSR is difficult to apply to chemical
282
283
arts,
such as selection of components
or structurally similar
284
compounds, without modification. In the Federal Circuit’s view, such
flexibility in establishing prima facie obviousness for chemical
285
compounds is consistent with the legal principles enunciated in KSR.
As Judge Rader has stated in Eisai Co, Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories,
286
Ltd., “[t]o the extent an art is unpredictable, as the chemical arts often
are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present
a difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be
287
genuinely predictable.”
Though the Supreme Court in KSR expressly stated that a flexible
approach of obviousness is desirable, the Court did not define flexibility
in any material way. Thus, it can be inferred from the proposal made by
Professors Burk and Lemley years before KSR that a flexible approach
of obviousness may include a judge-made industry-specific standard of
obviousness. Various industries have different characteristics, and a
288
nominally uniform rule would affect them differently. As Professors
Burk and Lemley have suggested, “[i]f the court is to make intelligent
289
policy, it must take the needs of those industries into account.”
Professors Burk and Lemley further suggested that courts are better
situated to engage in tailoring the standard of patentability than the
290
legislature. “Courts have substantial ability to profile an industry and
adapt innovation policy according to the profile, within a reasonable
291
time frame and at reasonable cost.” On the other hand, contrary to
the “flexible” application of the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in
280. Id. at 1352.
281. Id.
282. Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (C.A. Fed. 2008).
283. Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1351.
284. Eisai Co., Ltd., 533 F.3d at 1356–57.
285. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharmpty, Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (C.A.
Fed. 2008).
286. Eisai Co, Ltd., 533 F.3d at 1353.
287. Id. at 1359.
288. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1675.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1668.
291. Id.
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Federal Circuit cases, the PTO’s literal application of the KSR decision
word-by-word in its examination proceeding has essentially created
another set of rigid and inflexible rules of obviousness.
D. U.S. PTO’s Response to KSR
Around the time the Supreme Court’s KSR decision was issued,
statistics showed that the PTO had drastically adopted a higher
patentability requirement. Decisions issued by the Board of Appeals
and Interferences, after KSR, also indicate that the PTO has adopted a
more generous view of obvious-to-try, which is a significant departure
from the Federal Circuit’s consistent caution.
It is said that the PTO’s post-KSR obviousness rules do not
constitute substantive rule making and hence do not have the force and
292
effect of law. If the PTO’s practice is ignored, one may comfortably
conclude that the obviousness standard did not change much, since the
Federal Circuit has applied KSR flexibly. However, before a patent
applicant can reach any federal court, the applicant has to tackle the
PTO for years. Especially for a pharmaceutical or biotechnological
invention, the patent prosecution on average is much longer than other
293
types of patents, and therefore more expensive.
The aggregate
expenses of time, money, and other societal resources devoted to the
lengthy process are too enormous to count.
Coincident with the Supreme Court’s issuance of its KSR decision in
April 2007, the rate of patent rejection reversed by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences of the PTO dropped approximately 10% in
294
fiscal year 2007 compared to the previous year. The trend continued
295
to fiscal year 2008 and the reverse rate was 23.9%. In fiscal year 2009,
296
by December 31, 2008, the average reverse rate was as low as 18.6%,
compared to approximately 37.7% before KSR, which was the average

292. D. Christopher Ohly et al., It Is Not So Obvious: The Impact of KSR on Patent
Prosecution, Licensing, and Litigation, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 281 (2008).
293. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124–32 (2000).
294. The reporting period of a fiscal year is from October 1, of the previous year to
September 30, of the present year. According to the statistics released by the Board of the
Patent Appeals and Interferences of the PTO, the reverse rate in fiscal year 2007 was 25.1%,
compared to 34.8% in fiscal year 2006. USPTO, Receipt and Dispositions by Technology
Center, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/index.htm (last visited Jan.
22, 2009).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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reverse rate from fiscal year 2000 to 2006.
In addition, as Ohly has
observed, the PTO’s patent allowance rate has dropped approximately
298
10% since 2006.
Collectively, the low patent allowance rate at the examination level
and the low reverse rate at the appellate level suggest that the PTO has
drastically raised the standard of patentability coincident with the
issuance of the KSR decision. However, statistics alone do not
necessarily reflect how the PTO’s practice has changed or the extent of
change because there are always other factors that may contribute to
299
the figures. Therefore, a closer examination into the decisions issued
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the PTO before
and after KSR in similar invention contexts may be necessary.
Despite the Federal Circuit’s continuous caution about “obvious to
300
try” before and after KSR, the PTO has interpreted the Supreme
Court’s KSR teachings as if merely “obvious to try” is sufficient to find
301
obviousness.
For instance, as the Board of Patent Appeals and
302
Interferences stated in Ex Parte Kubin, “[u]nder KSR, it’s now
apparent ‘obvious to try’ may be an appropriate test in more situations
303
than we previously contemplated.” In Ex Parte Kubin, the applicants
claimed a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide whose amino acid
sequence is “at least 80% identical” to a known CD48 binding
304
polypeptide. In rejecting the applicant’s reliance on In re Deuel, the
Board stated that “[t]o the extent Deuel is considered relevant to this
case, we note the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the viability of
Deuel to the extent the Federal Circuit rejected an ‘obvious to try’
305
test.”
On the other hand, before KSR, the Board of Patent Appeals and

297. See id. The reverse rate was 38.9% in fiscal year 2000; 36.8% in fiscal year 2001;
37.4% in fiscal year 2002; 39.1% in fiscal year 2003; 37.4% in fiscal year 2004; and 39.6% in
fiscal year 2005 respectively. Id.
298. Ohly et al., supra note 292, at 286. See also Eugene Quinn, PTO Hiring Freeze and
Budget Problems, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/03/02/pto-hiring-freeze-and-budgetproblems/id=2099/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
299. Ohly et al., supra note 292, at 286.
300. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (C.A. Fed. 2008).
301. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kubin, 2007 WL 2070495 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. May 31,
2007); Ex Parte Haruo Watanabe, 2008 WL 838777, at *3 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. Mar. 26,
2008); Ex Parte Trono, 2008 WL 1993030 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. May 7, 2008).
302. Ex Parte Kubin, 2007 WL 2070495.
303. Id. at 5.
304. Id. at 1–2.
305. Id. at 5.
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Interferences had consistently found that “obvious to try” alone does
306
For instance, in Wen-Hwa Lee v.
not constitute obviousness.
Thaddeus P. Dryja, the Board stated that “[a] general incentive does not
make obvious a particular result, nor does the existence of techniques
307
by which those efforts can be carried out.”
The statement aptly
recognizes the nature of biotechnology research.
As explained in Part III, “obvious to try” is an anomaly in the
biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts. Because of the high
costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical research, a research proposal
is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of financial support without the
projection of a “reasonable expectation of success.” Nevertheless, a
documented “reasonable expectation of success” would render an
invention “obvious to try” under a “one-size-for-all” obviousness
jurisprudence. As a result, only very few, if any, biotechnology or
pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the suspicion of “obvious to
try” if the nature of the industry and the characteristic of the technology
is not taken into consideration.
Regardless of the inconsistency of obviousness standard before and
after KSR, there is uncertainty regarding the obviousness standard in
the reexamination proceeding for patents issued under the “old”
obviousness standard before KSR. It is unclear whether the PTO would
apply the “new” and higher obviousness standard to reevaluate a patent
issued under the “old” and lower standard. If the latter is the case, an
invention which was found “obvious to try” but nonetheless nonobvious under the old standard, would be easily struck down under the
new standard without the assistance of any newly discovered prior art.
The Patent Act provides that any person at any time may file a
request for reexamination by the PTO of any claim of a patent on the
308
basis of any prior art cited.
The Director of the PTO will then
determine “whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting
any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request, with or
309
without consideration of other patents or printed publications.”
If a
substantial new question of patentability is found, the Director will issue
an order for reexamination and a reexamination proceeding will

306. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kamboj, 2002 WL 1801076 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.); Wen-Hwa
Lee v. Thaddeus P. Dryja, 2005 WL 3121465 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.).
307. Wen-Hwa Lee, 2005 WL 3121465 at 30.
308. 35 U.S.C. § 302.
309. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
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follow.
It is worth noting that the “substantial new question of
patentability” does not necessarily rely on a newly discovered issue or
any newly discovered prior art which did not exist in the examination of
the original application. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) provides that “[t]he
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded
by the fact that a patent or printed publication was previously cited by
311
or to the Office or considered by the Office.”
Therefore, the
threshold for initiating a reexamination proceeding is considerably low.
312
It is well established that patent is a property right and it is
generally understood that patent is a contract between the government
313
and the inventor.
If an obviously higher obviousness standard is
applied in a reexamination proceeding and the patent previously issued
under a lower standard is revoked as a result, though the issue has not
been adjudicated, it may not be excluded that the possibility of a finding
of governmental takings would follow.
The extent to which a person had changed position in reliance upon
314
the prior law is an element in Fifth Amendment analysis.
As the
315
Supreme Court has stated in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., “the
patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances
in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period
316
of time.” “It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the
Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the
bargain by shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate
317
public access to the invention.”
Governmental takings may arise at the administrative level as well
as the legislative level. For instance, “Congress in performance of its
legislative functions may leave it to administrative officials to establish

310. 35 U.S.C. § 304.
311. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
312. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
642 (1999). “Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property.” Id. “As
such, they are surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a
State without due process of law.” Id.
313. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
314. Patlex Co. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (C.A. Fed. 1985).
315. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 55.
316. Id. at 63.
317. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rules within the prescribed limits of the statute.”
“A statute that is
valid on its face may nevertheless be administered in such a way that
319
constitutional or statutory guarantees are violated.” However, though
the PTO’s generous view concerning “obvious to try” after KSR may be
unique among major patent systems worldwide, the PTO’s generous
application is traceable to the Supreme Court’s self-contradictory
statement regarding “obvious to try.”
Nevertheless, there are signs showing that the Federal Circuit may
have begun cautiously loosening its defensive stance regarding “obvious
to try.” After the Board rejected Kubin’s patent application, the
320
applicants appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit
321
affirmed the Board’s rejection on the ground of obviousness.
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin has resolved the
inconsistency of obviousness standard between the court and the PTO
to some extent, though the Federal Circuit has indicated that the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences’s reasoning regarding obviousness
322
in Ex Parte Kubin was somehow misguided.
E. In re Kubin
In re Kubin signifies the cautious revival of “obvious to try” in the
biotechnological context under the Federal Circuit’s obviousness
323
jurisprudence.
The court officially rejected the formalistic approach
324
as represented by In re Deuel.
Even so, the decision does not
contradict the Federal Circuit’s continuing judge-made industry-specific
obviousness approach because the essence of such approach is
flexibility.
The claim in In re Kubin was directed to the DNA encoding the
CD-48 binding region of NAIL (Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing
325
Ligand) proteins, rather than the DNA encoding the NAIL proteins
or the NAIL protein itself. The appellants claimed a genus of DNA
whose sequences are at least eighty percent identical to the CD-48
326
binding region, but the specification only disclosed two examples.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Patlex Co., 758 F.2d at 605.
Id.
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (C.A. Fed. 2009).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
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In that case, the Federal Circuit did not address the issue of
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, because the court had found the
invention obvious and affirmed the Board’s decision under 35 U.S.C. §
327
103(a). However, the court should have affirmed the Board’s decision
under § 112 rather than under § 103. The insufficient disclosure in this
application is more obvious than the insufficiency of inventiveness.
There are technical factual issues unclear in this case regarding the
extent of inventiveness that may lead to a totally different outcome.
The appellants lost the battle probably because they did not draw
the court’s attention to the critical step in their application, namely the
discovery that NAIL proteins bind CD-48 proteins and the
328
identification of CD-48 binding site on NAIL proteins. The claim at
329
issue was directed to the CD-48 binding region of NAIL proteins.
However, throughout the opinion the court’s discussion of obviousness
was focusing on DNA encoding the entire NAIL proteins and the amino
acid sequences of the NAIL proteins as a whole, which has become a
routine technique in biotechnology research.
Though the appellants acknowledged in their application that CD330
48 binding is “a property necessarily present in NAIL,” it should be
noted that the difficulty in identifying a critical binding region on a
receptor is not comparable to the routine screening of DNA sequences
encoding the receptor from a commercialized cDNA library. The issue
is then how difficult it is to locate the range of the sequences, both in
DNA and in protein, which determine the specific binding property,
even if the property can be predicted in general. The shorter the
sequence which retains the same property, the higher specificity and
medical applicability is the peptide in human bodies. The appellants did
not explain, and neither the court nor the PTO has considered
inventiveness on this point.
In addition, the court did not address and the appellants did not
explain how difficult it is to screen the CD-48 as the binding protein of
NAIL extracellular domain, though the appellant did mention in the
brief that the Board has completely ignored “the number of options
related to the ultimate discovery that CD-48, a single protein among the

327. Id. at 1361.
328. Brief of Marek Z. Kubin and Raymond G. Goodwin at 48, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d
1351 (2009 WL 877646 (C.A. Fed.)) (No. 2008-1184), 2008 WL 2505893 (C.A. Fed.).
329. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1353.
330. Id. at 1357.
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undeniably large number of human proteins, binds to NAIL.”
As a
result, the obviousness of the invention in In re Kubin is not quite
obvious because certain technical factual issues were unclear when the
332
court made the finding of obviousness.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the written description of the
application in In re Kubin was not enabling. As explained in Part III,
the studies of single mutation or point mutation have shown that, even
one single deletion, insertion, or substitution either at the DNA level or
the protein level, may cause drastic change of the characteristics of a
DNA or protein. The appellants in In re Kubin claimed all possibilities
of combination of DNA sequences which are at least eighty percent
identical to a certain polypeptide. Some DNA sequences fall within the
scope may have unique properties due to one single deletion, insertion,
or substitution of nucleotide. What the appellants claimed was
something he or she could not characterize. In other words, the
appellants did not have possession of the claimed genus of DNA
molecules encoding at least eighty percent identical to the CD-48
333
binding region of NAIL proteins.
Therefore, the court should have
affirmed the Board’s rejection under § 112.
The Federal Circuit in In re Kubin also cautiously revived “obvious
334
to try” as an indicator of obviousness with some clarification.
The
Federal Circuit’s recent rejection of a formalistic approach as
represented in In re Deuel does not contradict with the Federal Circuit’s
continuing judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard, since
335
flexibility is the essence of such an approach.
The reason why the Federal Circuit had developed a rigid TSM test
and restricted the application of “obvious to try” in the past may be a
response to the bias that often resulted from analyzing the combination
336
of multiple prior art. In the EPO’s practice, the comparison between
331. Brief of Marek Z. Kubin and Raymond G. Goodwin at 33, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d
1351 (2009 WL 877646 (C.A. Fed.)) (No. 2008-1184), 2008 WL 2505893 (C.A. Fed.).
332. Though the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that Kubin’s invention
was obvious, the court pointed out that the Board’s reasoning was misguided. As the court
stated, the Board’s “emphasis on similarities or differences in methods of deriving the NAIL
DNA misses the main point of this obviousness question.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1356.
What the appellants claimed was DNA sequences, not cloning technique. Whether the
cloning technique is obvious is irrelevant in the analysis. Id.
333. Id. at 1353.
334. Id. at 1359. In referring to In re O’Farrell, the court cautioned that the meaning of
“obvious to try” is not as broad as what is often misunderstood. Id.
335. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (C.A. Fed. 1995).
336. See Alza Corp. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (C.A. Fed. 2006).
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the claimed invention and prior art is limited to one single reference.
The combination of multiple prior art indicates that inventive step may
338
exist.
It may be appropriate to apply “obvious to try” in In re Kubin. In
that case, the Federal Circuit has essentially reduced the prior art under
339
consideration to one single reference.
Therefore, it is proper to
caution that whenever “obvious to try” is to apply, the cited references
for comparison should be able to reduce to one or two as the court did
in In re Kubin. In doing so, hindsight judgment and bias would be
avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
Avoiding hindsight judgment and being more objective are the
universal and ultimate goals of obviousness analysis in almost every
patent system. An expansive and flexible obviousness approach as
stated in KSR should not be literally applied to all types of inventions
without further consideration.
An expansive and flexible approach is inconsistent with the
international norms of obviousness analysis if it is literally applied. For
instance, the problem-and-solution approach in the EPO practice, which
is followed by numerous countries, is a rigid step-by-step test. Even if
an expansive and flexible obviousness approach is preferable and can be
justified, the need for flexibility should be interpreted in a way that an
industry-specific obviousness standard is favorable, as exemplified by
the Canadian selection patent doctrine and its application in
pharmaceutical cases, which is traceable to English case law.
Though the KSR court reversed Graham as the highest principle in
making obviousness determinations, the KSR decision has unexpectedly
340
created the same problem that the Graham court sought to resolve.
That is, the inconsistency among the courts and the Patent Office. The

337. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C,
ch. IV, § 11.7.1.
338. Id. § 11.8.
339. The Board rejected appellants’ claims over the combined teachings of Valiante,
Sambrook, and Mathew. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1353. Nevertheless, the Board found
Mathew’s teachings only cumulative. Id. at 1354. Furthermore, as the Federal Circuit stated
that the Board’s emphasis on the similarities or differences in methods misses the main point
of the obviousness question, Sambrook’s teachings in Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory
Manual has essentially been disregarded, though mentioned, in the “obvious to try” analysis.
See id. at 1356.
340. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
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KSR decision has created legal uncertainty regarding obviousness from
at least three aspects: first, the inconsistency between the Federal
Circuit and the PTO; second, the inconsistency between the PTO’s
practice before and after the KSR decision; and third, the uncertainty of
the obviousness standard in a re-examination proceeding for a patent
341
issued before KSR.
Because of the high costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical
research, a research proposal is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of
financial support without the projection of a “reasonable expectation of
success.” Nevertheless, a documented “reasonable expectation of
success” would render an invention “obvious to try” under a “one-sizefor-all” obviousness jurisprudence. As a result, only very few, if any,
biotechnology or pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the
suspicion of “obvious to try.” Consequently, “obvious to try” may not
be an appropriate test under § 103 in the biotechnological and
pharmaceutical contexts under most circumstances.
Even if the application of “obvious to try” is desirable for certain
inventions, as shown in In re Kubin, a close examination and elimination
of cited references should be conducted before “obvious to try” can be
applied. If multiple references demonstrate equal weights to the
invention at issue and none of them can be regarded as cumulative, then
it may be an indication that the invention is non-obvious.

341. Id. at 398.

